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PASCAL'S WAGER AND THE PROBLEM
OF INFINITE UTILITIES
Jeffrey Jordan

In this paper, I identify two versions of an objection to Pascal's Wager which
claims that any calculation of expected utility which involves infinite utilities
will result in a situation of rational indeterminacy. One version holds that the
use of infinite utilities results in a decisional indeterminacy since any option
which offers an infinite payoff would also have an infinite expected utility.
The other version contends that whenever one includes infinite disutilities as
well as infinite utilities in a calculation of expected utility, a mathematical
indeterminacy results. I argue that neither version of this "indeterminacy
objection" is fatal to the Wager since a Pascalian can augment utility maximization with certain other plausible decision-theoretic principles in order to
resolve the indeterminacies.

A common objection to Pascal's Wager is based on its use of the notion of
an infinite utility.l This objection consists in the charge that a calculation of
expected utility which uses an infinite utility will always result in a rational
indeterminacy. Mathematical expectation, that is, when infinite utilities are
used, provides no guide for choosing between different courses of action.
In what follows I identify two versions of this indeterminacy objection to
Pascal's Wager. One version argues that a decisional indeterminacy would
result whenever one holds that several different decision options offer an
infinite utility. The other version of the objection contends that a mathematical indeterminacy arises from the use of infinite utilities in a calculation of
expected utilities. Neither version, I argue, is fatal to the use of infinite
utilities in Pascalian wagers. I will argue that if Pascal's Wager fails, then
this is due to some objection other than the alleged problem of infinite
utilities.
An examination of the indeterminacy objection has one other interesting
result: it shows that the standard version of the Wager, if it is to have any
cogency, must be augmented by certain decision-theoretic principles. These
principles are the subjects of sections two and three. I begin with a brief
discussion of the place of infinite utilities in Pascal's Wager.

I
The basic idea of the Wager, simply put, is that if God exists, then the
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consequence for the believer is infinite; while if God does not exist, the loss
for both the believer and the unbeliever is but finite. Since the pay-off of
belief is greater than non-belief, one has a good reason to try to bring about
theistic belief.2 The Wager, unlike, say, Anselm's ontological argument, does
not attempt to provide an epistemic reason for theistic belief. The Wager
attempts to provide a prudential reason for belief. A prudential reason is a
reason to think some belief beneficia!.3 An epistemic reason would be,
roughly, a reason to think a belief true or likely. Given that the evidence is
inconclusive, Pascal argues, one can properly consult prudence: "Your reason
suffers no more violence in choosing one rather than the other ... but what
about your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss involved by wagering that God exists."4 According to Pascal, theistic belief, because of its
promised pay-off, dominates its doxastic competitor of non-belief. This conclusion is arrived at via what has come to be known as 'the mathematical
theory of expectations.'
The mathematical expectation of an act A is determined by multiplying the
utility of each outcome of A with its associated probability, summing the
results, and then subtracting any cost attached to A.5 So, to take a simple
example, suppose one could wager on only one of either horse A or horse B,
where the probability of A winning is PI and that of B is p2. The pay-offs of
A and B, respectively, are a and b, and the costs of wagering are respectively
Cl and C2. The expected utility (EU) of betting on A would be determined by:
A. [probability x utility] - cost = EU

According to the mathematical theory of expectations, as long as (pia - Cl) ~
(p2b - C2), it is rational to bet on A. The justification for this claim is the
principle of utility maximization: in a decision situation, where both probability values and utility values can be assigned, one should choose to do that
act which has the greatest expected utility.
The utility of an act consists of the benefits which would result if that act
obtains. 6 A benefit could conceivably be anything valued by the agent. A loss
(or disutility) would be anything considered undesirable to the agent. The
probability assignments PI and P2, found in the example above, are subjective
estimations of the relative likelihood that A or B will win. Of course, the
mathematical theory of expectations does not require that the probability
values used be of the subjective sort, though this is the sort of probability
which lends itself most readily to Pascal's Wager.
There are two ways of generating an infinite expected utility. The first is
by means of an outcome which is itself valued infinitely by an agent. An
infinite utility would result whenever one has an unbounded preference for
a certain possible outcome obtaining. If there were something X which a
person valued infinitely, then there would be no finitely valued thing which
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that person preferred to X or was indifferent to regarding X. Provided that
one assigns some outcome an infinite utility, that outcome will dominate all
its competitors. That is, no matter how small the probability assigned (as long
as it is non-zero), an outcome with an infinite utility will always have a
greater expected utility than any outcome which has only a finite utility. This
first way we could term the 'qualitative' sense of an infinite expected utility.
The second way involves an infinite sequence of possible finite pay-offs. This
second way is found, for example, in the St. Petersburg game where a fair
coin is tossed repeatedly until that toss n upon which 'Heads' first appears,
at which time one is paid 2n dollars. The probability of a fair coin coming up
'Heads' on the first toss is 0.5 and the pay-off in that case is 21 and so the
expected utility of that one toss would be (1/2)2. Since a fair coin logically
could always come up 'Tails,' we have the non-convergent series:
(1/2)2 + (1/4)4 + (1/8)8 + (1/16)16 ... = 1+ 1+ 1+ 1...

which sums to infinity. Here there is nothing which is itself valued infinitely;
only a series of pay-offs which, since it has no mathematical limit, sums to
infinity. Unlike the first way, the second way offers no infinite pay-off: there
would never be an infinite pay-off possible given the second way, only a
possible unlimited supply of finite pay-offs. This we could term the
'quantitative' sense of an infinite expected utility.
The Pascalian notion of an infinite utility can be seen as a combination of
these two ways. The theistic notion of an afterlife is of an everlasting, happy
existence in the presence of God. This notion is quantitative in that the citizen
of heaven has an everlasting (endless) existence: one has, as it were, an
unlimited supply of 'happy utiles.' And this notion is qualitative in that this
happiness is not only unlimited, it is also nondiminishing and complete: each
moment lacks nothing which is necessary for happiness and each moment is
as saturated in felicity as the preceding one. Though sketched only in its
barest terms, this is, I think, something like what Pascal meant by the claim
that the theist gains, if God exists, "an infinity of an infinitely happy life to
win."7 Such an existence, an infinity of an infinitely happy life, would certainly seem preferable to any finite thing of value.
The standard expected-utility version of Pascal's Wager, briefly put, argues
that as long as some positive probability is assigned to the existence of God,
the expected utility of the act of theistic belief will dominate the expected
utility of any non-belief option. So, suppose that S thought it unlikely that
God exists; let's say, she assigns a 0.6 probability to the claim that God does
not exist. The EU of the act of non-belief would be:
B. [(0.6) (5) + (0.4) (5)]

=

5

where S assigns a value of five utiles to living life as she would, whether or
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not God exists, free of any religious inhibitions or burden of belief. g And
since S believes that there is no penalty assigned to one who does not believe
even if God does exist, there is also a five attached to that outcome. 9 The EU
of the act of belief though, even for S, would be:
C. [(0.4) (00) + (0.6) (-5)] = 00

where '00' represents an infinite utility. 10 Because there is an infinite pay-off
to be had if one believes and it turns out that God does exist, then the EU of
religious belief dominates: because EU(C) > EU(B), a Bayesian calculation
recommends, and would always recommend, the act of religious belief over
that of non-belief.
Without an infinite expected utility, a Pascalian wager would recommend
religious belief in some cases, but possibly not in all cases. The act of religious belief would not dominate its doxastic competitors and so the probability of God's existence would become a much more important component
of the calculation. As it stands, given the Pascalian assumptions of an infinite
pay-off to be awarded belief if God exists, a non-zero probability assigned
to the existence of God, and but a finite cost attached to religious belief,
Pascal will have his conclusion that one should try to bring about theistic
belief.

II
The objection that the notion of an infinite utility is problematic because an
indeterminacy always results can be formulated in a couple of different ways.
One way argues that a decisional indeterminacy arises whenever one holds
that it is possible that different acts might result in an infinite gain. The other
way contends that a mathematical indeterminacy could arise even with acts
considered in isolation. I begin with the former.
Suppose an agent believes that she can make the prospect of heaven more
or less likely by doing one of two acts. Act one the agent takes to have a 0.5
probability of bringing it about that heaven is achieved. Act two has but a
0.001 probability of the same end. It seems quite natural that the agent should
prefer the performance of act one over act two; but, when one calculates the
expected utility of each act, they both have the same EU. The mathematical
expectation of act one is:
1. [(0.5) (00) + (0.5) (0)]

=

00.

The calculation for act two is:
2. [(0.001) (00) + (0.999) (0)]

=

00.

The problem is obvious: EU(1) = EU(2). When the utility is taken to be
infinite and the cost finite, then, no matter how small the positive probability,
the expected utility is always infinite. To compound matters, the argument
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can be extended: any and every act has some probability, no matter how small,
of resulting in religious belief and thus bringing about heaven. Every act,
then, would have an infinite expected utility. As Antony Duff puts it:
... suppose I take no steps to make it more likely that I will come to believe
in God. There must still be some probability, however small, that I will
nonetheless come to believe in Him ... and that probability is enough to generate an infinite expected value for my actions. II
Given that every course of action has some probability of resulting in theistic
belief; and given that an infinite value multiplied by a finite value, no matter
how small, generates an infinite value, one may conclude that the inclusion
of infinite utilities in a calculation of expected utility results in mathematical
expectation being rendered useless as a means of decision resolution.
This objection is vulnerable to the following response. Unlike Buridan's
ass, the agent in the example does have a good reason to prefer act one over
act two, and, further, this is the case even when the expected utilities are the
same. Act one makes it more likely that the pay-off will be obtained and so
is quite properly preferable on that score. That is, the principle that:
D.

when each available incompatible act AI, A2, A3, ... , An has an infinite
expected utility and all other things are equal, one should perfonn that
act A which is considered the most likely to bring about the pay-off

is plausible. The provision, all other things are equal, though formulated
rather generally, is meant to exclude from the scope of (D) those cases in
which the utility assignments may be decisive. For example, imagine a case
where an act, AI, has an infinite EU and is also the most probable option of
those that have an infinite EU, but carries some risk of a great loss (disutility).
A2 also has an infinite EU, is just somewhat less probable than AI> but has
no risk of a great disutility. As described A2 may well be preferable to AI.
A2, we could say, because of its utility assignment, overrides the (otherwise)
attractiveness of AI which was due to its somewhat greater probability.12
Since act one and act two both have an infinite EU, following (D), one
should choose to perform act one because that act makes the attainment of
the pay-off more likely. The decision to perform act one, then, properly rests
not only on its EU but also on its probability. The addition of (D) as a
tie-breaking principle of calculation circumvents the alleged decisional indeterminacy of infinite expected utilities.

III
The second way of formulating the objection that the use of infinite utilities
results in an indeterminacy would proceed without the claim that different
acts are necessary in order to generate an indeterminacy. 13 Without different
acts, (D) is inapplicable. So, suppose that an agent believes that a certain act
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B (where B is belief in the theistic god) has a 0.45-x probability of bringing
about an infinite outcome (heaven), a 0.55 probability of no afterlife and a
very remote probability of resulting in an infinite disutility (hell). The EU of
B would be:
3. [(0.45-x) (00) + (0.55) (r) + (x) (_00)] = 00 + _00

where 'r' is a finite utility and 'x' is some non-zero probability which is very
small. Proposition (3) is, quite obviously, problematic in that subtraction is
not well defined for infinite cardinals. The EU of B is mathematically indeterminate.
This is, by the way, a version of the most popular criticism offered against
the Wager: the 'many-gods' objection. 14 In other words, (3) includes not only
the utilities and probabilities of the respective outcomes for a belief in God,
contingent on God's existence; it also includes an outcome in which some
deity other than God exists, such that this other deity punishes with an infinite
disutility all those who believe in God.
Though it is true that (3) results in a mathematical indeterminacy, it is not
clear why (3) might be thought to be a problem for the notion of infinite
utilities. Clearly there is a problem with (3) as it stands, but why should one
think this is so generally? One plausible response to the indeterminacy found
in (3) involves the removal of the infinite disutility (_00) from the calculation.
Without the infinite disutility, (3) would yield, of course, a determinate value.
The justification for this removal is as follows. Every act has an infinite
number of logically possible outcomes; and consequently, every act has an
infinite number of possible outcomes which are properly ignored or removed
from the decision calculation.l~ For example, when tossing a coin, though
one justifiably takes the only possible outcomes to be 'Heads' and 'Tails,' in
fact any number of bizarre but possible events might occur: the coin might
land on its edge, it may remain suspended in mid-air, the coin might vanish
as it is tossed, and so on. In a similar way, a Pascalian could hold that the
likelihood of there being a god who punishes all and only theists with an
infinite disutility, is so wildly remote that it is properly ignored. 16
It is important to notice that one cannot remove the infinite disutility just
because it, along with the infinite utility, leads to an indeterminacy. The
removal of the infinite disutility is permissible because the outcome associated with it (there being this other sort of god) is thought to be so remote, so
unlikely, that it warrants nothing but neglect.
One might think that the removal of the infinite disutility from (3) is
impermissible just because there is an infinite value involved. That is, in most
decision situations which have outcomes with vanishingly small probabilities,
one can ignore those outcomes because, when multiplied by a finite utility,
these outcomes would contribute only a very tiny amount to the overall
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expected utility. This amount, because it is so small, is irrelevant. So, with
the coin toss, the probability of the outcome in which the coin lands on its
edge is so small that that outcome is really not worth the notice. But in the
case of (3) things are rather different. There we have not a finite utility
involved, but an infinite one. And since infinity multiplied by any finite
amount yields an infinity, the amount which results would clearly not be
irrelevant.
Though the foregoing objection might seem plausible, it is erroneous in
that it neglects an important point. Every act carries with it possible outcomes
which involve infinite utilities. Just as any and every act might result in
religious belief and so might result in an infinite utility, there might be, for
any act one picks, some bizarre god who punishes the doer of that act with
an infinite disutility. The probability of this is no doubt vanishingly small,
but a non-zero probability is sufficient when multiplied with an infinite value
to render an infinite value. Hence, any and every act carries the sort of
indeterminacy found in (3). So, just as we properly neglect very remote
possibilities in mundane decisions, we are justified in doing so in Pascalian
decisions also.
The neglect of very remote catastrophic outcomes is not, then, unique to
the Pascalian. It is a maneuver which is both common and rational. 17 But once
that point is recognized, it is clear that the indeterminacy found in (3) is not
incurable. The prescription is a good dose of partition exclusion: limiting the
outcome in one's decision matrix to real outcomes only.IS That which is
merely possible and wildly improbable is properly neglected and, paraphrasing William James, left for "dead."19
On the other hand, suppose that one assigned the following values in a
calculation of expected utility:
(4) [(0.44) (=) + (0.55) (r) + (0.01) (-=)]

=

= + -=.

Proposition (4) differs from (3) in that the probability assignment associated
with the infinite disutility is much greater than is the case with (3). The
indeterminacy in (4) cannot be removed in the manner outlined above, simply
because the relevant outcomes involved are all considered as real, as relatively likely possibilities. If one considers outcomes associated with both
infinite utilities and infinite disutilities as real possibilities in a calculation
of expected utility, then the indeterminacy is not properly removable as is
the case with (3). Nevertheless, I see no reason to think that (4) is a problem
which shows that any use of an infinite utility in a Pascalian wager will result
in a situation of mathematical indeterminacy. While it is true that certain
expected-utility uses of infinite values may result in debilitating mathematical indeterminacies, it is also clear that other uses, like that of (3), need not.
One might wonder if the probability assignments found in (3) are realistic.
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Is there any reason to suppose that there might be circumstances in which it
would be rational to have the probabilities specified in (3)? A use of the
principle of indifference, for instance, would not yield the probability disparities found in (3). The two deity hypotheses seem a priori similar. So, the use
of the principle of indifference would sanction assigning the two hypotheses
equal probabilities. If the two deity hypotheses have equiprobable assignments, then the probability disparity which is necessary to remove the "offending" infinite utility assignment will be missing.
Though it is true that a use of the indifference principle will not yield the
probability assignments found in (3), the probability assignments in (3) would
be realistic and rational given other sorts of evidence. For instance, suppose
that, after reflecting on the various arguments, pro and con, concerning the
existence of God, one judges that the evidence is roughly balanced. Further,
this person decides that, if there is a god, it most probably would be the
theistic god (though one is willing to admit that it is possible that one could
be wrong about this, that there might exist some deity other than God).20 With
regard to the evidence, this person would be in an agnostic position: this
person judges that the evidence is roughly balanced. 21 This is, by the way, a
general description of the sort of individual for whom Pascal original\y wrote
the Pensees: a lapsed theistic believer who, if she will consider any religious
hypothesis, will consider only the theistic one. The probabilities specified in
(3) reflect the assignments of a person who sees theism and a purely naturalistic outcome as being the only real outcomes.
The Wager, under this view, is not a free-floating argument designed to
demonstrate the rationality of theistic belief, no matter what the positive
probability is which one assigns to theism. The Wager is, rather, a sort of
tie-breaker: if one judges that there is an epistemic parity between theism and
naturalism, the Wager can tip the scales in favor of belief. Because the
expected utility of theistic belief is greater than that of non-belief and because
the relevant evidence is roughly balanced, it is reasonable to believe. This
view of the Wager is, briefly, that the Wager (a consideration of prudential
rationality) is operative only if the evidence (epistemic rationality) is not
conclusive. The theoretical advantage of this view is that the Wager could
not be contrary to epistemic rationality, it could only supplement the evidence. 22 The Wager needs, then, the support of other arguments in order to
justify the probability assignments (like those found in (1) and (3» which are
necessary if it is to have a chance at plausibility. The Wager needs, in a sense,
the rest of the Pensees in order to work. 23
It is clear, I think, that the probability assignments of (3) are realistic and
rational, given the sort of description found above. Indeed, many persons in
contemporary society would fit this description: persons who are agnostic
about the existence of God, but who think that the only real outcomes are
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theism and naturalism. The Wager could be a good reason for them to believe,
even if it is not a good reason for the convinced atheist.

IV
As things stand, the indeterminacy objection in both its versions fails to show
that a Pascalian use of an infinite utility is problematic. The objection does
show that the standard expected-utility version of the Wager must be augmented, at least in some cases, with other decision-theoretic principles.
Though this decision-theoretic augmentation renders the wager argument a
bit more complex than Pascal's original formulation, this is hardly reason to
think the wager argument fallacious. 24 Consequently, if Pascal's Wager fails,
it does so due to some problem other than the indeterminacy objection. 25

University of Delaware
NOTES
I. See, for instance, Richard Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 153-54. And see Antony Duff, "Pascal's Wager and Infinite
Expected Utilities" Analysis 46 (1986), pp. 107-09.
2. Though this version of the Wager is that of a decision-under-uncertainty, the genuinely Pascalian versions of the Wager are those of a decision-under-risk. Versions of the
Wager shorn of probability considerations are found in several authors prior to Pascal (see
J. K. Ryan "The Wager in Pascal and Others" New Scholasticism, 1945, pp. 233-50).
Pascal's innovation was the use of probability in a wager context. It is this sort of wager
that I have in mind throughout the rest of this paper. See Pensees, Trans. J. Warrington,
ed. L. Lafuma (London: 1. M. Dent & Sons, 1960), pp. 92-96.
3. Or if one prefers, a prudential reason to think some act beneficial. Under this construal
the Wager would not recommend one to believe that there is a god, but to try to bring it
about that one believes that there is a god.

4. Pensees, pp. 93-94.
5. A 2x2 (two acts and two states) decision matrix would look like this:
states

x
A

Y
U 2,P 2

acts
B

The vertical entires, A and B, are the contemplated acts (the decision options); the
horizontal entries, X and Y, are the states of nature (the possible states of affairs). The
entries within the matrix are the possible outcomes. The utility values, U ,-U4 , are deter-
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mined by the agent involved, as are the probability values, P I-P4' The EU of, say, act A
is calculated by [(UIP I) + (U 2 P 2) = EU(A»). And, it should be noted, I - (PI) = (P 2), just
as 1 - (P3) = (P4). Of course, more complex matrices (2x3, 3x3 ... ) could be constructed
in similar fashion.
6. It would be possible for an act to have several positive outcomes. The expected utility
of such an act would just be the probability-weighted average of the several outcomes of
the act.

7. Pensees, p. 94.
8. The numerical units of utility are idealized. But they are meant to represent S's
preferences relative to a selection of certain outcomes.
9. Despite the oral tradition to the contrary, Pascal did not include as a part of his Wager
the claim that there is an infinite penalty to be had if one does not believe in God and God
does in fact exist.
10. The symbol, '00,' though not used in transfinite mathematics, is meant to represent
the notion of an infinite utility. It is assumed that 00 consistently represents the same order
of infinity throughout the paper.
11. A. Duff, "Pascal's Wager and Infinite Utilities," p. 108.
12. See G. Schlesinger, New Perspectives on Old-TIme Religion (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1988), pp. 152ff. for a proposal on the use of the probability and utility factors
individually as decision-theoretic guides to be used in conjunction with utility maximization.
13. For an example of this version of the indeterminacy objection, see R. Jeffrey, The
Logic of Decision, pp. 153-54.
14. See, for example, Michael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), pp. 232-34.
15. I use the tenns 'remove,' 'ignore,' and 'detach' interchangeably.
16. For more on this sort of response to the many-gods objection, see my "Pascal's
Wager and the Many-Gods Objection," forthcoming in The International Philosophical
Quarterly.
17. For an example of this sort of maneuver which involves only finite utilities, see
Stephen Stich, "The Recombinant DNA Debate" Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (1978),
pp. 189-91.
18. Admittedly, the notion of a real possibility is vague; the idea is, however, intuitive
enough for our purposes here.
19. Such outcomes are clearly not what James called "live hypotheses." See "The Will
to Believe" contained in The Will to Believe and Other Essays (New York: Dover, 1956),
pp.2-4.
20. The bare possibility of there being some god other than the theistic god is found in
(3) as the remote probability x.
21. This would be what we could call "evidential agnosticism," the position that the
evidence is roughly balanced between theism and atheism. There is another species of
agnosticism, less common than evidential agnosticism, call it "epistemic agnosticism,"
which holds that there is no evidence either for or against theistic belief. For example, A.

THE PROBLEM OF INFINITE UTILITIES

59

J. Ayer, at least at the time of Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover, 1946), would
be an epistemic agnostic (according to Ayer, because theological propositions are nonsensical, there could be no evidence for theism). The Wager would be appropriate only for
the evidential agnostic and not the epistemic agnostic because, briefly put, the probability
assignments of an epistemic agnostic would lack the disparity between the competing
deity hypotheses; and in any case, the probabilities assigned to the theistic hypothesis by
the epistemic agnostic would probably be small (if any assignment at all were made).
22. This view of the Wager is consistent with Pascal's original formulation in that Pascal
claims that "reason cannot decide for us one way or the other ... " Pensees, p. 93. It is also
similar to Thomas Morris's distinction between the epistemically concerned version of the
Wager and the epistemically unconcerned version. See his "PascaIian Wagering" in
Anselmian Exploration (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987),
pp. 197-202.
23. Or something like the Pensees. Much of the Pensees seeks to show by arguments
from fulfilled prophecy and miracles that if any religion were true, it would be Christianity
and not its main monotheistic rivals, Judaism and Islam. This sort of argument (that
Christian theism is the most probable of all the relevant alternatives), if persuasive, would
provide some support for a probability assignment like (I) or (3). On the relation between
the Wager and the rest of the Pensees see Daniel Fouke, "Argument in Pascal's Pensees"
History of Philosophy Quarterly volume 6, number 1 (1989), pp. 57-68.
24. Sometimes the objection to the inclusion of infinite utilities in the Wager is done
via the St. Petersburg paradox. The paradox is, put simply, that the st. Petersburg
game-tossing a coin with a pay-off of 2° for whatever toss n 'Heads' first appears-calculates as having an infinite expected utility (it being possible, no matter how improbable,
that a fair coin would always come up 'Tails'). But of course no one would pay much in
order to play this game. From this it is often concluded that the notion of an infinite
expected utility is problematic. There are, however, plausible ways to solve the paradox
which do not resort to rejecting infinite utilities. One such way would argue that because
the probability of a fair coin always coming up 'Tails' is so small (for any real number n
you pick, the probability of that occurring is less than n), it is reasonable to treat the St.
Petersburg paradox, at some point, as if it has a zero probability. This would effectively
defuse the paradox without thereby rejecting the notion of an infinite utility.
25. I thank Thomas Morris, William Hasker and especially Philip Quinn for their helpful
comments on earlier versions of this paper.

